Europe In Indo-Pacific

Introduction

The Biden administration has long sought to focus Europe’s attention on the rising challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This effort began with a social media post before the administration even took office, when incoming national security advisor Jake Sullivan expressed concern over an EU-China investment agreement in December 2020. A few months later, Secretary of State Antony Blinken mentioned China 11 times in a speech at NATO headquarters about efforts to shape American alliances; he mentioned Russia only four. On a range of fronts and through multiple vehicles, including the Group of Seven (G7), Washington has worked with European and Indo-Pacific partners to build an agenda to reduce critical dependencies on China and build the capacity to resist economic coercion. However, despite Washington’s pressure on Europe to focus on China’s economic challenge, it has been less clear what the United States seeks from Europe militarily in the Indo-Pacific region — other than “more.”

U.S. engagement has been effective in aligning European perspectives and approaches to the region. China is now a major focus of transatlantic discussions and European countries have prioritized developing a common approach. Although the shift is uneven, from London to Berlin to Rome most European capitals are adopting a tougher approach to managing the economic relationship with China — as shown by the European Union’s ongoing investigations into potential Chinese dumping of electric vehicles, medical devices, and solar panels. European countries are also deepening engagement with Indo-Pacific partners on issues related to economic security. Japan and the European Union are cooperating to promote supply chain resilience in critical sectors like semiconductors, for example, in a shared effort to reduce dependence on China — a dialogue that is more advanced than it is with the United States.

However, the picture is less clear on defense and security issues, with little consensus or focus on how Europe should deepen its engagement with countries in the Indo-Pacific. The leaders of several close U.S. allies and partners in the region — Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea — have begun regular participation in the annual NATO summit, a significant development pushed by the Biden administration. But the ultimate purpose of this engagement remains unclear, and other steps — such as the purported plans to establish a NATO office in Tokyo in 2023 — have proven controversial and were opposed by several member states. The United Kingdom, through the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United States and the Global Combat Aircraft Program (GCAP) with Japan, has stepped up engagement with Indo-Pacific partners. Yet other instances of defense engagement by European countries in the region have been mostly ad hoc and symbolic, such as the passing exercises with Asian partners through the European Union’s Operation ATALANTA, including with the Pakistani navy in June 2021.

This picture of unfocused engagement and occasional mixed messages begs the question: What security role should the United States seek for Europe in the Indo-Pacific? Can European partners make a meaningful contribution to deterrence and contingency response in the region, and if so, how? Are the potential benefits of enhanced engagement worth the cost, given the ongoing war in Ukraine and the security needs of Europe? And more broadly, how should Europe engage the Indo-Pacific on defense and security issues?

This report aims to address these questions. It finds that Europe has a significant interest in upholding a free and open Indo-Pacific and can contribute to regional security in targeted ways. The deepening cooperation and engagement between Moscow and Beijing underscores that security in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are linked — a reality that South Korea and Japan have clearly recognized through their strong support for Ukraine. In principle, a deeper European role in Indo-Pacific security would therefore be a welcome development and should be encouraged.

At the same time, Europe’s role in the region in the near term is constrained by its limited military means and by the direct and intensifying challenge posed by Russia. Europe’s priority should therefore be to ensure its own security in the face of the Russian threat, and to build the capacity to enable the United States to shift focus and respond effectively in the event of a military contingency or crisis with China. The driving focus of European defense planning and procurement should be ensuring that Europeans can provide more for their own security at a time when U.S. military capabilities are needed elsewhere.

But the need for Europe to focus on ensuring its own security does not make countries in the region irrelevant to security in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, in addition to Europe’s extensive economic and diplomatic ties, European countries — particularly the United Kingdom and France — have important military resources, including space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and cyber capabilities, that can supplement those of the United States and Indo-Pacific allies on the margins. A revived European defense industrial base could provide a vital boost to global defense materiel production and increase the credibility of U.S. alliances globally. European arms sales and security assistance could also directly support capacity building among allies and partners in the region. Finally, the maintenance of a European defense presence in the region, however modest and if employed with purpose, can reinforce international law and send an important signal to China about the potential costs of aggression, particularly if that presence is linked to the European Union’s economic strength.

The driving focus of European defense planning and procurement should be ensuring that Europeans can provide more for their own security at a time when U.S. military capabilities are needed elsewhere.

Over the longer term, the United States should seek to provide pathways for an expanded European role. European rearmament is underway, meaning that where Europe is today does not reflect where it will be in 5 to 10 years. Thus, Europe may be able to contribute much more over time to Indo-Pacific security, as its capacity grows and if the Russian threat recedes. The United States should keep this in mind when considering its longer-term defense planning in the Indo-Pacific and should seek to shape European defense planning and transatlantic defense industrial engagement with an eye toward a potentially larger role in the Indo-Pacific over time. In short, encouraging and incorporating a greater European defense role in the Indo-Pacific should be part of a longer-term strategy toward the region.

This report will first outline Europe’s strategic dilemma, in which it must balance significant interests in a stable Indo-Pacific with the imperative of deterring a revanchist and aggressive Russia on its eastern flank. It will describe the view from the Indo-Pacific, in which a broad demand for more European defense engagement is tempered by a desire to avoid dividing the region into blocs. The report will then explore the potential vehicles for Europe’s military engagement with the Indo-Pacific region and how these relate to U.S. regional interests. Finally, it will provide recommendations for what the United States should seek from its European allies.

Part I

Europe’s Role in the Indo-Pacific

Economic Links

Europe’s stake in a free and open Indo-Pacific is vast, and a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea would directly impact its security and prosperity. The EU market is roughly equivalent in size to the United States or China, making it a key economic partner with countries throughout the region. Around 40 percent of the European Union’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea, for example. Between 2011 and 2021, imports from the Indo-Pacific to the European Union increased 64 percent, from €515 billion (about $474 billion) to €844 billion ($776 billion), while exports grew 44 percent, from €407 billion ($374 billion) to €583 billion ($536 billion). The European Union is also the largest investor in the region, which includes four of the bloc’s top global trading partners: China, Japan, South Korea, and India.

Moreover, any action taken by China to seize control of Taiwan or to threaten international maritime traffic in the South China Sea would directly affect European citizens in the region. The Indo-Pacific is home to millions of European citizens, including 1.8 million French and at least 1.7 million British across the region and more than 30,000 Europeans living in Taiwan.

Beijing is keenly aware of the importance of Europe’s market and has consistently sought to undermine efforts within the European Union to forge a common trade and economic policy toward China. As such, China has worked to cultivate relations with individual European countries, most notably Germany, Europe’s economic powerhouse, and Italy, which initially signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative before recently withdrawing. China has also sought to create a new multilateral form of engagement with both EU and non-EU countries in Eastern Europe, called the 17+1, which was a deliberate effort to divide Europe.

Further, China has sought to target European countries pursuing policies at odds with Beijing’s interests. For example, China imposed severe import restrictions on goods from Lithuania after the Baltic country withdrew from the 17+1 grouping and allowed Taiwan to establish a new trade office in Vilnius. After the Netherlands joined with the United States to restrict exports of high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China, Beijing imposed export controls on critical minerals that are crucial to the European Union’s digital and green transitions.

The European Union, with the authority to negotiate trade deals, regulate its single market, and impose sanctions, has recently taken the lead in forging a more collective European strategy toward China. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has championed a “de-risking” approach to mitigate critical dependencies and supply chain vulnerabilities, while avoiding the economic damage of a more comprehensive decoupling of trade ties. More broadly, the 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific aims at a free and open Indo-Pacific for all while building strong and lasting partnerships in areas including security and defense, ocean governance, and the green transition. To protect individual EU countries vulnerable to economic coercion, Brussels also created a new anti-coercion instrument that could allow the European Union to impose trade restrictions, such as higher import tariffs or limited access to EU public tenders. The European Union also passed a Critical Raw Materials Act specifically to reduce its reliance on China for key inputs to Europe’s manufacturing base for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and other green goods.

Defense Ties

Militarily, European countries have significant capabilities that in theory could be valuable in the event of an Indo-Pacific contingency. For example, European countries collectively possess 116 large naval surface combatants and 66 submarines as of 2021. Despite significant gaps compared to its U.S. ally, European forces also possess air enabling capabilities, including roughly 35 command and control (C2) platforms, about 150 air-to-air refueling aircraft, a few dozen reconnaissance aircraft, and roughly 200 uncrewed aerial vehicles. European states collectively possess sizeable fleets of fifth-generation fighter jets, which could augment American air power. Europe’s defense industrial capacity is also ramping up following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Two European countries, France and the United Kingdom, operate regularly in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain significant capabilities there. France has long been Europe’s most prominent actor in the region, through its overseas territories, permanent forces in both the Indian and Pacific oceans, regular multipurpose deployments, and strong cooperation and arms sales with strategic partners, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Singapore. France has 7,000 permanently stationed personnel (4,100 across the United Arab Emirates, Djibouti, and La Réunion and Mayotte Islands in the Indian Ocean and 2,900 across New Caledonia and French Polynesia in the Pacific Ocean) with substantial capabilities, including fighter jets, surveillance frigates, and tactical transport aircraft.

The United Kingdom also plays a significant role in the region. As then foreign secretary Boris Johnson declared in 2016: “Britain is back east of Suez.” Although the United Kingdom’s current military assets in the region are limited, London has prioritized engagement with the region through several long-term military agreements. Its participation in the AUKUS initiative will see it increase its military role, such as through presence in the Submarine Rotational Force-West out of Australia. Additionally, during then defense secretary Ben Wallace’s visit to Japan in 2021, the United Kingdom announced that it would permanently deploy two patrol vessels to the region, now hosted in Singapore. This followed the deployment of a carrier strike group to the region led by the HMS Queen Elizabeth which included U.S. and Dutch warships, designed to demonstrate freedom of navigation rights under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The deployment included joint exercises with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in 1971. Britain also concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement with Japan in 2023 and has committed to a regular trilateral exercise with Japan and the United States beginning in 2025. And as noted, the United Kingdom is working with Italy and Japan under the GCAP program to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter jet by 2035. For both France and the United Kingdom, European security remains the priority focus — but both have stepped up in the Indo-Pacific.

More recently, a broader range of European countries has undertaken episodic long-distance deployments in the area. Following the release of the European Union’s 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy, Germany and the Netherlands deployed military vessels to the region for the first time. German defense minister Boris Pistorius described the Indo-Pacific as “the most strategically important region on Earth,” in which “decisions about freedom, peace, and prosperity in the world are made.” Aircraft from Germany, France, and Spain — together representing the trinational Future Combat Air System, expected to reach full operational capacity by 2040 — will depart on a major exercise tour across the Asia-Pacific in mid-2024 to deepen ties with regional partners. Italy is also ramping up its Indo-Pacific engagement, with plans to send its carrier strike group to the Rim of the Pacific exercise in June–July 2024. These deployments send a message by the participants that they reject China’s maritime claims, they are committed to upholding UNCLOS, and there will be costs to future aggression.

While this increased military activity by European states sends a useful message to Beijing, what does it say about Europe’s potential role in a regional contingency? Some scholars contend that European states have critical capabilities that could be brought to bear in the defense of Taiwan and should be the focus of concrete military planning. For example, Luis Simón, Daniel Fiott, and Octavian Manea argue that “Europeans can play a strategically meaningful military contribution in the Indo-Pacific, both in peacetime and wartime. The subsurface domain would be particularly critical in any Indo-Pacific contingency, and the combined UK and French subsurface nuclear (SSN) force would constitute around 15–20 percent of the U.S. one, and far above anything U.S. regional allies may be in a position to bring to bear within the next decade at least.” After China carried out live-fire exercises surrounding Taiwan in July 2022, Admiral Pierre Vandier, former head of the French navy, noted that “against the Chinese navy, we will win if we fight together, in coalition” during a hearing in the French parliament.

Yet U.S. military leaders planning and preparing for a possible conflict over Taiwan are focused almost exclusively on the role of allies who would be close to the fight. Although South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines would all be directly impacted by a conflict, the degree to which Washington can rely on even them to support U.S. military operations remains open to question. This uncertainty complicates U.S. military planning in a region that lacks a multilateral alliance structure with a unified chain of command. Attempting to comprehensively incorporate European partners, whose willingness and ability to contribute is even less certain, into U.S. military planning for a conflict over Taiwan has therefore not been a U.S. priority. In sum, Europe’s growing defense engagement in the region is useful from a messaging standpoint but will do little to reinforce deterrence or contribute if it remains episodic and unconnected to concrete contingency planning.

In sum, Europe’s growing defense engagement in the region is useful from a messaging standpoint but will do little to reinforce deterrence or contribute if it remains episodic and unconnected to concrete contingency planning.

The View from the Indo-Pacific

For their part, all major U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific are pursuing deeper security engagement with European partners, as part of a larger strategy that acknowledges the linkages between security in Europe and Asia.

Japan’s December 2022 National Defense Strategy, for example, states, “With partners like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy, Japan will mutually reinforce involvement in global security issues as well as challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific.” In an opinion piece published in 2023, then foreign minister Yoshimasa Hayashi wrote, “Japan will fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities and strengthen cooperation with NATO and other like-minded countries, in order to shore up and defend the free and open international order based on the rule of law.” The European Union also maintains a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Japan that spans a wide range of economic and security issues and is arguably the most comprehensive of all European partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries.

In Seoul, the government of President Yoon Suk Yeol has sought to build ties with NATO in part as a response to the UN Security Council’s inability to address North Korean provocations in the face of obstruction by China and Russia since early 2022. Facing this deadlock, South Korea seeks new global governance institutions and partners to address the growing threats from Pyongyang. South Korea’s national security strategy, released in April 2023, states, “The European Union (EU) and European countries share universal values with the Republic of Korea, [and] . . . the Yoon Suk Yeol administration seeks to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with Europe on global issues and build a value-based diplomatic partnership.”

Australia demonstrates a similar approach. Its 2023 Defence Strategic Review notes, “We must also enhance . . . engagements with the E.U., its member countries, and NATO.” The strong support to Ukraine offered by Japan, South Korea, and Australia was aimed at strengthening relations with Europe, with the expectation that Europe would provide similar support in the face of aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

At the same time, U.S. partners in the Indo-Pacific are at times ambivalent about the proper role of European partners in the region’s security and the best means to operationalize that role. While U.S allies have embraced a closer relationship with NATO outside the region, countries in Southeast Asia and among the Pacific Islands are wary of strengthening formal arrangements that could signal a region dividing into blocs — a sentiment China has actively sought to promote. In response to media reports that NATO was considering opening an office in Tokyo — an initiative that fizzled in the face of backlash from France and in the region — China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson asserted, “NATO’s attempt to make eastward inroads into the Asia-Pacific will inevitably undermine regional peace and stability. The countries and people in this region are on high alert against this and firmly oppose any words or actions designed to bring military blocs into this region and stoke division and confrontation.”

However far-fetched, these arguments have resonance in parts of the region. In a May 2022 interview, then Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong commented, “Countries in Asia, many of them enjoy good ties with China, as well as with the US and the US’ treaty allies. . . . I think that is a better configuration than one where countries are divided along a line and one bloc confronts another.” He added, “That is the history in Europe, but it has not been the history in Asia. And I think it is better that it remains not.” In response to the reports about the possibility of a NATO office in Tokyo, an Indonesian diplomat wrote, “NATO has little to contribute toward stability in the Asia-Pacific region . . . bringing NATO to Asia will do more harm than good.” Participants from multiple countries in a CSIS study group voiced similar caution about the downside of deeper NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

In sum, while many Indo-Pacific partners — particularly U.S. treaty allies — in principle welcome deeper European defense and security engagement in the region and are pursuing their own deeper ties with NATO, how and where that engagement is executed, and through what structures, matters. This ambivalence serves to reinforce a key point: the concrete benefits to Indo-Pacific security of deeper European engagement — through strategic messaging, contingency planning, or capacity building — must outweigh the downside risk of playing into Chinese narratives on the “NATO-ization” of Asia, particularly in light of the need for Europe to sustain a focus on the security challenge posed by Russia in Europe.

The concrete benefits to Indo-Pacific security of deeper European engagement — through strategic messaging, contingency planning, or capacity building — must outweigh the downside risk of playing into Chinese narratives.

The Bear in the Room: What Would Russia Do?

The dilemma for Europe is that while it does have military capacity that can contribute to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and can be helpful at the margins in responding to aggression, it also faces a revanchist and irredentist threat from Russia. While Russian president Vladmir Putin will not remain in office indefinitely, as long as Russian foreign policy adheres to its anti-Western and revisionist outlook, Europe will have to remain on guard.

Moscow would likely see Chinese military aggression as creating opportunities for Russia to exploit. Sino-Russian relations may fall short of an established alliance. But Chinese support for Russia, while perhaps less than what Russia initially hoped for — particularly in terms of direct military assistance — has proven vital to Russia’s war effort by reviving and ramping up Russia’s defense industry. In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, China would have a military interest in encouraging opportunistic aggression from Russia to create dilemmas for the United States in Europe and stretch U.S. forces. Moreover, the Kremlin would be eager to see a U.S. military defeat in the Indo-Pacific and would likely want to challenge or threaten Europe’s security architecture. Moscow is also willing to take risks in its deployment of military force, as demonstrated not just by its invasion of Ukraine, but also in its intervention in Syria, its use of a chemical weapon to assassinate Russian dissidents on UK soil, and the proliferation of Russian “private military contractors” in Africa to support anti-Western military leaders.

In the event of a conflict over Taiwan, China would have a military interest in encouraging opportunistic aggression from Russia to create dilemmas for the United States in Europe and stretch U.S. forces.

Thus, the potential for Russia to directly threaten European security and NATO would likely increase significantly in the event of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. For example, in this scenario Russia might be more willing to gamble that the United States would be unable to respond decisively to a lightning attack on the Baltics.

U.S. Overstretched?

There is an ongoing debate about whether global demands on the U.S. military are overstretching its capabilities, particularly in responding to a conflict over Taiwan. While it is beyond the scope of this report to fully address this debate, it is fair to assume that a potential conflict with China over Taiwan would be all-consuming for the United States. China’s military buildup, including its modern rocket forces, space and cyber capabilities, advanced naval combatants, and large numbers of advanced fighter, bomber, and uncrewed aircraft would pose a major challenge to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. The United States would need to guard against the risk of opportunistic aggression within the region as well, as North Korea could seek to exploit a conflict over Taiwan to advance its interests on the Korean Peninsula. Europe and NATO should assume any conflict with China would stretch American military capacity.

The United States would undoubtedly pull significant military assets out of the European theater to support a major campaign to defend Taiwan. These would likely include aircraft carriers operated by the U.S. Sixth Fleet headquartered at Naval Support Activity Naples and enabling capabilities such as airborne C2 and air-to-air refueling — where Europe lags far behind the United States. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has revealed both the massive quantity of munitions needed in a conventional conflict and Europe’s shockingly limited stockpiles. An Indo-Pacific contingency would consume vast quantities of U.S. munitions and defense materiel to the detriment of Europe, as the United States would be either unable or unwilling to supply considerable munitions to the European forces. As an example, a recent CSIS study found that the United States would likely consume the entirety of its inventory of Long-Range Anti-ship Missiles (LRASM) in a week during a conflict over Taiwan.

An Indo-Pacific contingency would consume vast quantities of U.S. munitions and defense materiel to the detriment of Europe, as the United States would be either unable or unwilling to supply considerable munitions to the European forces.

Russia could seek to take advantage of the shift in U.S. posture. Thus, the prospect of the United States pulling assets out of the European theater makes European participation in an Indo-Pacific contingency potentially challenging given the renewed threat posed by Russia on Europe’s eastern flank and Europe’s limited capabilities.

Part II

Objectives for European Defense Engagement in the Indo-Pacific

The main contribution Europe could make to Indo-Pacific security in the short to medium term, given the continuing threat posed by Russia, is to alleviate the demands on U.S. forces by strengthening Europe’s own capacity for its defense at home. This will require significant resources and a change in emphasis of European procurement efforts and in how the United States approaches NATO and European security.

However, while Europe’s military focus should be on NATO’s area of responsibility, that does not preclude a European contribution to the Indo-Pacific, particularly over the medium to long term. If Russia is deterred from military action and distracted and consumed by the war in Ukraine, or should a less anti-Western government emerge in Moscow, that may free up important European resources for the Indo-Pacific. As such, while the near-term focus of U.S. efforts should be on encouraging Europeans to build forces to deter Russia, the United States should not preclude European involvement in an Indo-Pacific contingency and should engage European partners in a discussion of requirements during a crisis. Furthermore, over the longer term, a Europe rearmed with capable and ready forces may be able to significantly contribute to security in the Indo-Pacific. That means the United States should seek to deepen European defense engagement with the region and expand the connections of European defense partners with the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in Hawaii. These efforts should be undertaken bilaterally or with small groups of European partners — and not through NATO.

Europe’s Core Military Role: Cover the Flanks

In a world of rapidly growing Chinese military power in the Indo-Pacific and a proximate Russian threat in Europe, some geographic division of labor between the United States and its European allies is inevitable. Rather than avoid discussion of this reality, the United States and its European allies should acknowledge and explicitly plan for it. Doing so does not mean that the United States should focus solely on security in the Indo-Pacific; the United States can and should sustain a central role in European security for the foreseeable future, even as it dedicates increasing resources to the potential threat posed by China. Nevertheless, it is time for the United States and Europe to engage in a frank dialogue about priorities and trade-offs in U.S. force posture globally, and to prepare European partners for the need to sustain deterrence under conditions that involve a smaller U.S. presence.

It is time for the United States and Europe to engage in a frank dialogue about priorities and trade-offs in U.S. force posture globally, and to prepare European partners for the need to sustain deterrence under conditions that involve a smaller U.S. presence.

Washington should press Europe to prepare to deter Russia with less U.S. support. The United States has not been frank with its NATO allies about the impact a war in the Indo-Pacific would have on its presence in Europe. The force planning construct underpinning the United States’ 2022 National Defense Strategy assumes a military that is sized to prevail in conflict against a peer competitor — with China identified as the pacing challenge — while employing “a range of risk mitigation efforts” to deter opportunistic aggression elsewhere. However, these statements remained largely undefined, and the reality is that a conflict with China would almost certainly precipitate major adjustments in U.S. force posture globally, including in Europe. The inclination of U.S. officials is to reassure NATO allies of its steadfast commitment to their security, regardless of global conditions, but doing so evades a necessary discussion of how a conflict in Asia would inevitably impact U.S. presence in Europe. In fact, an Indo-Pacific contingency greatly increases the potential for Russian aggression in Europe. This is the scenario that NATO and Europe need to prepare for — one in which Europeans are required to defend themselves while the United States is focused elsewhere. NATO planning must begin to consider the realistic possibility of opportunistic aggression by Russia in the event of a conflict over Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula.

The United States should clarify to NATO allies the impact an Indo-Pacific contingency would have on the European theater. Requirements for U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific depend on the scenario, but a significant draw on a range of capabilities — particularly air, naval, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets — would seem nearly certain. It is critical that the United States attempt to give some clarity to NATO in order to provide direction to European procurement and planning efforts. As a general principle, the United States should take steps to be more transparent with European and Indo-Pacific allies about joint strategic planning and information sharing to live up to its commitment to make allies and partners a “center of gravity” in its 2022 National Defense Strategy. This will require a far more forward-leaning approach to information sharing on contingency planning than exists today.

European defense spending should focus on addressing potential gaps left by the United States. Defense spending by EU member states increased by 6 percent in 2022 compared to the previous year, reaching a record €240 billion ($260 billion). But European countries are not concentrating their efforts on procuring capabilities that can help mitigate the gaps that would be left by the United States in the event of a crisis elsewhere. U.S. engagement should encourage them to do so.

Europe should help secure sea lanes of communication and key maritime choke points. As the United States surges naval assets to the Indo-Pacific, Europe could help fill the gap. Simón, Fiott, and Manea argue, “Europeans can contribute by securing the sea lanes of communications in the Indian Ocean, which would be important in an Indo-Pacific contingency, but also in other important areas like space and ammunition, as well as investing in a common pool of inter-theater capabilities.” For instance, five European countries have military bases in Djibouti, as do the United States and China. Securing the entry point into the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea would be an allied priority and could be a focus for European militaries. Additionally, European naval forces could help deter opportunistic aggression from Iran and help ensure trade continues to flow from the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.

European–Indo-Pacific Security, Defense Cooperation, and Engagement

Even as NATO and European states should focus on preparing to defend the continent with less U.S. support, there remain meaningful ways that they can contribute to deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific — and over the long term, the potential for significant contribution to security in the region is very real. European engagement in the Indo-Pacific should be targeted, and for the most part executed outside a NATO framework. As such, the United States should consider the following recommendations:

Keep NATO out of the Indo-Pacific. The downside of direct NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific probably outweighs the benefits. The more than 30 members of NATO hold widely different views of China, a fact that would undermine the alliance’s ability to forge a meaningful agenda for the region. NATO engagement also risks playing into Chinese narratives regarding purported U.S. efforts to divide the world into competing blocs. With the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s security situation and NATO’s focus has reverted to its original raison d’etre, protecting Europe and deterring Russia. This is where it should remain.

But, bring the Indo-Pacific to NATO instead. On the other hand, the growing engagement of Indo-Pacific allies with NATO in Europe should be welcomed and expanded. The attendance of the IP4 countries at NATO summits (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea) has demonstrated solidarity with Ukraine and support for European security. Indo-Pacific engagement with NATO could be a vehicle for valuable information sharing and exchange on Chinese and Russian threats and help to narrow gaps in perceptions across regions. It could facilitate increased coordination and set common standards for weapons production, such as munitions that could then be used interchangeably among countries. NATO can also provide important lessons learned on opportunities and challenges of coalition warfighting. Engagement could be expanded beyond the IP4 to include other likeminded allies and partners in the region, such as the Philippines and Singapore — should they express interest in joining.

Focus on building deeper and denser partnerships between Europe and the Indo-Pacific at the bilateral or “minilateral” level. Europe’s direct military engagement with the Indo-Pacific should be primarily done by individual European states. Thus, the United States should support expanded bilateral military-to-military and political-to-military engagement between European and Asian partners and expand efforts to engage and incorporate willing partners into defense planning. Instead of seeking to develop a formal multilateral structure for this engagement, such as a European “Quad” to engage the existing Indo-Pacific Quad (consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia), the United States should encourage more organic cooperation. For instance, along the sidelines of the annual Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, European defense officials could arrange a structured dialogue with their Indo-Pacific counterparts, with or without U.S. participation.

Expand coordination and engagement between Europe and INDOPACOM. Incorporating a more significant role for Europe militarily in the Indo-Pacific necessitates a greater presence in Hawaii at INDOPACOM. Having a broad and robust global coalition of allies and partners committed to promoting regional stability and potentially joining the war-fighting effort has clear benefits. But a broad coalition can also add complications. Given the stakes of a war in the Indo-Pacific, the emphasis of U.S. war planners will be on what added military value can be brought to bear, as opposed to the diplomatic or optical value of having a large coalition. The United States should focus its engagement on a small subset of European partners who can make a meaningful military contribution during a conflict — in particular the United Kingdom and France — and work to define operational contributions during peacetime and contingencies. However, the United States should not preclude other allies and partners from contributing, especially as European defense capabilities expand in the years ahead. The United States should insist that European countries that wish to engage are prepared to bring real military capabilities and commitments to the table, even if small. Today the only European partners with liaison officers at INDOPACOM are the United Kingdom and France; several others, including Nordic states, have expressed interest. This interest should be encouraged, provided it is accompanied by a willingness to commit resources, however small, to the region.

The United States should focus its engagement on a small subset of European partners who can make a meaningful military contribution during a conflict — in particular the United Kingdom and France — and work to define operational contributions during peacetime and contingencies.

Foster engagement between states on the Baltic and South China Seas. The Baltic and South China Seas have similar operating environments, with relatively shallow bodies of water neighboring revisionist powers who assert unlawful claims, engage in unsafe operational behavior, and threaten maritime neighbors. Nordic navies and coast guards could provide security and capacity-building assistance to the navies and coast guards of maritime Southeast Asia, such as training and equipment transfers. For example, the United States has provided coast guard cutters to Vietnam and the Philippines, which have been refurbished and become important naval vessels; it should encourage states on the Baltic Sea to offer similar capacity-building and training initiatives. Sweden has already participated in such a program through the European Union’s Capacity Building Mission in Somalia, donating vessels to the Somaliland Coast Guard and providing training and maintenance.

Promote the development of an EU naval mission in the Indo-Pacific. Europe’s naval presence in the region is useful in signaling to China that it is not just the United States that is concerned about a free and open Indo-Pacific. But Europe’s naval presence could send a stronger signal if it were more tightly linked to the European Union’s economic clout; after all, it is Brussels that will respond economically in a crisis, as it is responsible for the single market and therefore sanctions. A major purpose of freedom of navigation operations is to convey to China that Europe is both engaged in the region and concerned about Chinese behavior, meaning that action against Taiwan or international shipping will prompt a European response. Since this response is likely to be primarily economic in nature, meaning it would be an EU competency, it makes sense for the European Union to expand its naval efforts into the Indo-Pacific.

The European Union has a track record of conducting naval operations in response to regional security threats. These include Operation ATALANTA to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Horn of Africa and Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean to enforce a UN arms embargo to Libya. More recently, the European Union has launched a security and defense partnership with four coastal states by the Gulf of Guinea to mitigate pressure exerted by terrorist groups in the region. To protect cargo ships under attack by Yemen’s Houthi rebels, the European Union also launched a naval mission in the Red Sea in early 2024, with up to seven member states providing ships or planes. Finally, the European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMP) tool enables the bloc to act as one militarily in areas of interest. This is essentially a way to work around the European Union’s inability to operate a formal naval command by establishing a maritime surveillance arm to coordinate air and naval assets, achieving the same effect.

The European Union should focus on forging a more cohesive and integrated European approach to the region. This means linking Europe’s significant economic clout and its primary lever to impose costs against China — sanctions — with its diplomatic and military efforts and signaling in the region. The EU role would be to manage and coordinate Europe’s naval presence. For example, regional EU missions could serve as the anchor for a pan-European naval attaché or even as a liaison office for maritime operators. Having EU-flagged vessels traverse the region may also expand the number of EU countries willing to participate, as operating under an EU flag provides more protection against Chinese economic retaliation. Additionally, the European Union has the benefit of being a relatively new actor, without much of the historic baggage of the United States, NATO, or indeed many EU member states with a colonial past. As Eve Fitriani found in a Carnegie Europe paper examining Indonesia’s views of the European Union, “Compared with other major powers, the EU is seen more positively in the eyes of Indonesians, who prefer the EU as an international partner over the United States, China, or Russia.”

Encourage European partners to use regional deployments to directly challenge unlawful Chinese maritime claims. The periodic naval deployments of several European countries over the last few years — including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy — sent an important message to the region about Europe’s stake in Indo-Pacific security, but the military value of such activities is limited. Given that their frequency is unlikely to change significantly, Washington should urge its European partners to define a clear operational purpose for such deployments. In addition to providing opportunities for ad hoc training and exercises, these deployments should be used to advance the larger effort to push back on excessive Chinese maritime claims and uphold international law. Specifically, in coordination with INDOPACOM, European navies could conduct transits of the Taiwan Strait — as the UK navy has done — or conduct freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea to contest specific Chinese maritime claims in the region. Simple “presence operations” are not enough: European navies should be prepared to directly challenge China’s unlawful claims, to reinforce the message that China’s actions are a global issue.

Elevate the U.S.-EU Security and Defense dialogue. The establishment of the U.S.-EU Security and Defense dialogue was met with considerable opposition inside the U.S. government. The dialogue has now been formed and has proved useful; however, the engagement is conducted at the deputy assistant secretary level on both sides. Given the potential utility of EU naval missions, the importance of the European Union’s voice in upholding international agreements such as UNCLOS, the development of significant EU-funded security assistance programs, and growing EU investment in defense, the dialogue should be elevated to an assistant secretary level and should include an official on both sides responsible for Indo-Pacific security affairs.

Encourage the European Union to speak out more forcefully on Indo-Pacific issues. Washington should encourage the European Union and European countries to speak out more forcefully when China violates international law and norms. For instance, China is routinely violating UNCLOS, to which European countries are signatories and can speak on with authority. The EU delegation to the Philippines in Manila put out a joint statement on UNCLOS and Chinese violations; this should be common practice.

Encourage defense industrial cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. There is growing defense industrial engagement between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For instance, Poland has bought large quantities of Korean-made equipment, including tanks and artillery. Additionally, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan have joined together to produce a next-generation fighter jet under the GCAP program. This sort of collaboration may create stronger competitors to U.S. industry and at times further disrupt Europe’s already fragmented defense industrial base. Yet the United States should encourage these types of defense industrial engagements, which significantly strengthen ties and can help network U.S. allies and partners. They will increase industrial capacity globally and make Europe and Indo-Pacific partners feel more vested in the security situation in each other’s regions. For example, France’s extensive arms-sales relationship with India has helped strengthen ties between Paris and New Delhi. AUKUS has contributed to the United Kingdom’s Indo-Pacific tilt and provides perhaps the most prominent example of industrial cooperation between Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Additional partners, in Europe or the Indo-Pacific, should be brought in to collaborate on AUKUS Pillar Two as soon as possible.

Promote NATO standardization of armaments to boost capacity for partners. European defense production is ramping up in response to Ukraine, and this capacity could help augment U.S. production in a conflict. For instance, Europe can boost U.S. defense industrial capacity particularly when it comes to munitions, such as 155-millimeter artillery, and more sophisticated precision-guided munitions, such as Storm Shadow. However, that requires the defense industry to ensure U.S. weapons platforms can use such munitions interchangeably. Thus, the United States should prioritize ensuring a higher level of NATO standardization of munitions, because it has direct implications for the United States if it wants to tap into European defense production. The United States should also seek to encourage broader standardization among its allies — both in Europe and Asia. Thus, NATO could seek to include the armaments directors of the IP4 countries in many of its discussions and meetings to ensure broader standardization.

Encourage Europe to become a security assistance provider to the Indo-Pacific. EU assistance could be directed toward countries that complement U.S. engagement or have needs that go beyond what existing U.S. and other allied assistance can provide. Presently, European assistance efforts are limited by both decades of underinvestment in defense and the need to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, Europe may in the coming years increase its capacity to transfer weapons to Indo-Pacific partners.

First, prior to the Ukraine war, the European Union created the European Peace Facility (EPF), a security assistance fund that can provide weapons to partners. The EPF is now being used largely to support Ukraine and has seen its budget dramatically increase to €17 billion ($18.5 billion) for use between 2021 and 2027. While Ukraine has been its overwhelming focus, the EPF was developed with the objective of aiding developing countries outside of Europe, much like the State or Defense Department’s security assistance fund. While the original budget for the fund is far less than U.S. security assistance programs, the fund’s budget before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was projected to be roughly €850 million ($1 billion) per year. The United States should engage with the European Union on this fund and encourage funding for the Indo-Pacific, and coordinate in identifying priority capabilities and partners.

Second, Europe is engaged in a significant force modernization, which may lead in the coming years to the retirement of systems excess to requirements. Much of these systems will likely head to Ukraine, but there may be opportunities in the maritime domain. Lastly, Europe may also have significant spare production capacity in the coming years. As it ramps up to support Ukraine and rebuild its stockpiles, it may have significant overcapacity in future years that could be used to support and build ties with certain Indo-Pacific partners.

Conclusion

China’s support for Russia in the invasion of Ukraine underscores the reality that security in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe are linked. U.S. alliances in Europe and the Indo-Pacific can therefore no longer be managed as separate entities, with contingency planning undertaken in isolation and without regard to trade-offs and the possible interplay of conflict across theaters. In the near term, U.S. policy should focus on ensuring that NATO and European allies can sustain deterrence in Europe with a reduced U.S. role. Europe’s role in Indo-Pacific security by necessity should therefore remain small and focused on discrete areas where concrete contributions are possible. Over the longer term, Washington should open a pathway for a European contribution to Indo-Pacific security.

Max Bergmann is the director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Christopher Johnstone is senior adviser and Japan Chair at CSIS.